‘Negligence’ may have caused RDM blast that claimed eight lives

‘NEGLIGENCE' was involved in the deadly explosion at Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM), which claimed the lives of eight workers three years ago.

This emerged with further witness testimony in the inquiry into the 2018 explosion.

Final testimonies will be heard today during the public inquiry by the Department of Employment and Labour to investigate events leading to the incident.

The inquiry is being held at the Salt River Community House.

Testifying virtually yesterday, retired RDM employee and former explosives manager, Ernest Hodgson said the modification committee, which he also served on, submitted a review for the iris mucon valve which was in use at RDM.

However, he told the hearing, the process was incomplete.

“There was a request in 2017 for a risk assessment to be done but the risk assessment has not been done…

“If a modification was installed and the modification had not been signed off, it cannot be used,” said Hodgson.

Advocate Winston Erasmus, representing the grieving families of the workers who lost their lives, probed Hodgson on what the action would amount to if a modification was fitted in the absence of a formally approved risk assessment process.

“Negligence” was Hodgson's answer.

Hodgson said a modification process, which is subject to approval, must first be signed off for it to be compliant with the safety standard requirements.

He said he was unaware of the safety irregularity breach when the iris mucon valve was fitted at the N16 plant, replacing the butterfly valve, days prior to the explosion.

Louis Minnaar had just returned to his position as head of site on the day of the explosion after three months working at another Denel site in Boksburg.

He said the N16 plant “was not remotely under pressure” at the time of the explosion.

This was despite the fact that staff were working overtime at the site the weekend before the explosion.

Despite having been away from the site, Minnaar said he understood that a “risk analysis was in process but it was just not signed off”.

He added that the installation of the new valve, in his opinion, “could have been seen as insignificant as it had no effect on conductivity”.

“As a rule, we would not start with production without a risk analysis in place,” said Minnaar.

A witness called by Erasmus,

Shafieka Naidoo who had at the time of the explosion been working in the building next to N16, also testified that at the time of the explosion, “four different propellants” were on the site.

She described this as an irregular practise.

She testified that she had submitted a statement of what had happened on the day of the explosion to RDM two days after the incident.

But, she added, “I was pushed away”.

Naidoo, who was a cutting operator at the time of the explosion, further testified that raw materials used at the N16 plant “were not safe” as there was “old material and it wasn't coated”.